Title VII\u27s Anti-Retaliation Provision Prohibits Any Employer Conduct That Might Dissuade a Reasonable Worker from Making or Supporting a Charge of Discrimination: \u3cem\u3eBurlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White\u3c/em\u3e by Metcalfe, Michael A.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 45 Number 4 Article 6 
2007 
Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision Prohibits Any Employer 
Conduct That Might Dissuade a Reasonable Worker from Making 
or Supporting a Charge of Discrimination: Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White 
Michael A. Metcalfe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael A. Metcalfe, Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision Prohibits Any Employer Conduct That Might 
Dissuade a Reasonable Worker from Making or Supporting a Charge of Discrimination: Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 45 Duq. L. Rev. 761 (2007). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol45/iss4/6 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision Prohibits Any
Employer Conduct That Might Dissuade a
Reasonable Worker from Making or Supporting a
Charge of Discrimination: Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
CIVIL RIGHTS - TITLE VII - RETALIATION - The United States
Supreme Court held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is
not limited to workplace-related conduct that affects the terms
and conditions of employment, but rather prohibits any employer
conduct constituting a materially adverse action - i.e., one that
well might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or support-
ing a charge of discrimination.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
In June 1997, Respondent Sheila White was hired as the only
female employee of the Maintenance of Way Department at the
Tennessee Yard of Petitioner Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. (hereinafter "Burlington"). 1 White was hired to work
as a track laborer, a position that required her to perform primar-
ily manual labor. 2 Shortly thereafter, White was assigned the
more prestigious and less arduous position of forklift operator.
3
In September 1997, White lodged a complaint with Burlington
officials alleging that her immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner, had
made numerous inappropriate and insulting remarks to her.4
Burlington investigated White's complaint; as a result of the in-
vestigation, Burlington suspended Joiner for ten days and re-
quired that he attend a training session on sexual harassment. 5
On September 26, 1997, Burlington's roadmaster, Marvin
Brown, told White of Joiner's disciplinary action and informed her
that she was being reassigned from forklift duty to her original
1. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
2. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
3. Id.
4. Id. According to White, Joiner had repeatedly stated, inter alia, that women should
not be permitted to work in the Maintenance of Way Department. Id.
5. Id.
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track laborer position.6 Brown stated that White's reassignment
resulted from co-workers' complaints that the more desirable fork-
lift operator position should be given to a male employee with
greater seniority. 7
White filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter "EEOC" or "Commission") on October 10,
1997, alleging that her reassignment constituted unlawful gender-
based discrimination and retaliation for her complaint regarding
Joiner's remarks." In early December 1997, White filed a second
EEOC charge alleging that Brown had subjected her to surveil-
lance and had begun to monitor her daily activities. 9 White
claimed that the surveillance and monitoring constituted further
retaliation for her September complaint against Joiner. 10
A few days after White filed her second retaliation charge, she
and her immediate supervisor, Percy Sharkey, had a minor dis-
pute, and Brown suspended White that afternoon for insubordina-
tion.11 White challenged her suspension by filing an internal
grievance. 12 After Burlington's internal investigation revealed no
evidence of insubordination, White was reinstated, receiving
backpay for the thirty-seven days during which she had been sus-
pended. 13 As a result of the suspension, White filed a third re-
taliation charge with the EEOC. 14
After White exhausted her administrative remedies, she sued
Burlington in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.15 White alleged in pertinent part that her re-
assignment to track laborer duties and her thirty-seven-day sus-
pension constituted acts of retaliation prohibited by Title VII.
16
The jury found in favor of White on both claims, awarding her
compensatory damages of $43,500.17 After trial, the district court
denied Burlington's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 18
6. Id.




11. Id. Although the precise nature of the disagreement is not clear, it arose from the
matter of which truck would transport White to another location. Id.
12. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2410.
16. Id.
17. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
18. Id.
Vol. 45762
Summer 2007 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, finding in fa-
vor of Burlington on the retaliation issue. 19 The majority held
that neither White's reassignment nor her suspension was an ad-
verse employment action sufficient to support a Title VII claim.
20
However, in a rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit Court affirmed
the district court's judgment in favor of White. 21 The en banc
court held that both White's reassignment and her suspension
constituted adverse employment actions.
22
Both the panel and the en banc court agreed with the district
court that the "adverse employment action" standard used in dis-
crimination cases brought under Title VII's substantive discrimi-
nation provision 23 must also be applied to retaliation cases
brought under the anti-retaliation provision. 24
An "adverse employment action" is defined in substantive dis-
crimination cases as a 'materially adverse change in the terms
and conditions' of employment." 25  However, other circuits have
not taken the same approach to retaliation cases. 26 Courts of ap-
peals have disagreed over two issues in particular: (1) whether the
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits only actions related
to employment or the workplace, and (2) the degree of harm re-
quired in order to constitute retaliation actionable under Title
VII. 27 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
these two issues.
28
19. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002).
20. White, 310 F.3d at 455.
21. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(hereinafter "White II").
22. White II, 364 F.3d at 791, 803.
23. The substantive discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides in perti-
nent part:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
24. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006). The anti-
retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in pertinent part: "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge ...under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a).
25. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting White II, 364 F.3d at 795).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2408.
28. Id. at 2411.
763
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Justice Breyer, writing for an eight-member majority of the
Court, held that Title VI's anti-retaliation provision is not limited
to employer actions that affect the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. 29 With respect to the second issue, the Court held that
in order to establish a claim of discriminatory retaliation, a plain-
tiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the
employer's action to be materially adverse. 30 A materially adverse
action is one that "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."31
Burlington argued that because Title VII's substantive dis-
crimination provision prohibits only employment-related discrimi-
nation, the anti-retaliation provision should be read to apply only
to the same category of actions, i.e., employment-related actions. 32
However, the Supreme Court did not accept Burlington's conten-
tion that the two pertinent provisions of Title VII should be read
in pari materia.33 Rather, the Court found that the language of
the two provisions significantly differed. 34 As the Court noted, the
substantive discrimination provision provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .... 35
The anti-retaliation provision, however, states more simply that
"[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge ... under this sub-
29. Id. at 2412. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2418.
30. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. In pari materia means "on the same subject; relating to the same matter."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004).
34. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411.
35. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)).
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chapter."36 The Court found the scope of actions prohibited by the
substantive discrimination provision to be limited by words and
phrases such as "hire," "discharge," "compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment," "employment opportunities,"
and "status as an employee." 37 The Court concluded that, because
the anti-retaliation provision contains no such language, there can
be no question of reading the two provisions in pari materia.38
Instead, as the Court stated, the proper inquiry is whether Con-
gress intended the linguistic disparity between the two provisions
to make a legal difference. 39
Justice Breyer concluded that Congress did intend such a differ-
ence, because in addition to their terminological differences, the
two provisions also serve different purposes. 40 According to the
Court, the substantive discrimination provision attempts to en-
sure a workplace free of discrimination, whereas the anti-
retaliation provision seeks to prevent employers from interfering
with an employee's attempts to pursue such a workplace. 4
1
The Supreme Court concluded that the objective of the anti-
retaliation provision could not be secured by prohibiting only em-
ployer actions related to employment and the workplace.
42
Rather, as Justice Breyer noted, an employer might retaliate
against an employee by causing the employee harm away from
work. 43 The Court reasoned that a provision that prohibited only
workplace or employment-related retaliation would fail to secure
the primary purpose of such a provision, namely, preserving em-
ployees' freedom to invoke Title VII without fear of retaliation. 44
Therefore, the Court held that, unlike the substantive discrimina-
tion provision, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is not limited
to employer actions that affect the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. 45
Having reached this conclusion, Justice Breyer proceeded to ad-
dress and refute three arguments adduced by Burlington, begin-
36. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
37. Id. at 2411-12.
38. Id. at 2412.
39. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
40. Id.
41. Id. Stated otherwise, "the substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to indi-
viduals based on who they are, i.e., their status," whereas the "anti-retaliation provision
seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.




ning with the contention that Supreme Court precedent ought to
compel a different holding. 46 Burlington argued that according to
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,47 Title VII requires a tangi-
ble employment action such as termination, failure to promote or
hire, or a detrimental reassignment. 48 However, the Court re-
jected this argument, noting that Ellerth sought only to establish
a class of hostile work environment harassment cases in which
employers should be vicariously liable, without access to an af-
firmative defense, for harassment committed by supervisors.
49
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Ellerth mentioned nei-
ther the substantive discrimination provision nor the anti-
retaliation provision of Title V1.
50
Second, the Court addressed the contention that the EEOC's
own interpretation of Title VII requires a tangible employment
action. 51 The Court concluded that, although the EEOC stated in
its 1991 and 1998 Compliance Manuals that the anti-retaliation
provision is limited to "adverse employment-related action," the
same manuals also suggest a broader interpretation. 52
Third, Burlington argued that it would be anomalous to con-
strue Title VII such that victims of retaliation receive greater pro-
tection than victims of substantive discrimination. 53 The Court
rejected this argument on two grounds. 54 The Court first noted
that in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, Congress
has provided a broad protection from retaliation without limiting
such protection to the kinds of action proscribed by the statute's
substantive provisions. 55 Second, the Court reiterated its conclu-
sion that the two relevant provisions of Title VII are intended to
achieve different purposes. 56 For these reasons, the Court con-
cluded that it is not anomalous that the anti-retaliation provision
46. Id. at 2413.
47. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
48. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2413.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2413-14.
52. Id. at 2413. Furthermore, the Court found that when the EEOC directly addressed
the question of whether the anti-retaliation provision concerns only the same conduct pro-
hibited by the substantive discrimination provision, the EEOC concluded that the anti-
retaliation provision was not so limited. Id. at 2414.
53. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2413.
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should provide a broader scope of protection than the substantive
discrimination provision. 57
The Court then turned to the second major issue in the case:
how harmful must an employer's conduct be in order to constitute
actionable retaliation under Title VII? 58 The majority elected to
adopt the standard articulated by the Seventh and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits. 59 According to that formulation, a plaintiff must
establish that a reasonable employee would find the alleged action
to be "materially adverse," meaning that "it might well have dis-
suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination. 6 °
According to the Court, the material adversity requirement
would ensure that only significant harms are addressed by Title
VII, which is not intended to function as a general code of conduct
for the workplace. 61 Under the material adversity standard, mi-
nor acts of interference or annoyance are not a substantial enough
deterrent to warrant Title VII protection. 62 Similarly, by employ-
ing a "reasonable employee" standard, the Court attempted to en-
sure that Title VII would be applied objectively and consistently,
without undue reference to a particular individual's feelings or
perceptions. 63 However, the Court noted that it phrased its hold-
ing in general terms so that courts might properly weigh the com-
plex circumstances of each case, rather than rigidly applying a
strict formula. 64
Having determined the scope of the anti-retaliation provision
and the required degree of harm, the majority then applied its
standard to White's case. 65 The trial judge had instructed the jury
to determine whether White had "suffered a materially adverse
change in the terms or conditions of her employment."66 Against
57. Id.
58. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-16.
59. Id. at 2414-15.
60. Id. at 2415.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. Justice Alito suggested in his concurrence that the
majority did not stand by its reasonable employee standard, but rather took into account
certain individual characteristics of the plaintiff, thereby effectively creating the somewhat
confusing standard of "a reasonable worker who shares at least some individual character-
istics with the actual victim." Id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 2415-16 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 2416-18.
66. Id. at 2416. On appeal, the en banc Sixth Circuit upheld the trial judge's standard
and affirmed the jury's determination that both White's reassignment to track laborer
duties and her thirty-seven-day suspension constituted actionable retaliation. Id.
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Burlington's argument that White's reassignment was not a suffi-
ciently adverse employment action, the Supreme Court observed
that the EEOC has long considered unfavorable reassignments to
be actionable retaliation. 67 As the Court noted, whether a "reas-
signment is materially adverse" is a fact-specific question that can
only be answered in light of the surrounding circumstances. 68 The
majority held that, because the position of track laborer was more
arduous and less prestigious than that of forklift operator, the jury
reasonably concluded that a reasonable employee would have
found White's reassignment to be materially adverse.
69
Burlington also argued that White's suspension did not consti-
tute actionable retaliation because White had been reinstated
with backpay and because Title VII historically had not provided
equitable relief for employees under such circumstances. 70 The
Court rejected these arguments on the ground that injunctions
had been granted under Title VII throughout its history to deter
future recurrences of discrimination. 71
Although Justice Breyer noted that the standard applied at trial
was excessively stringent inasmuch as it required a change in the
terms or conditions of employment, the Court held that the jury's
findings of material adversity with respect to both White's reas-
signment and her suspension were supported by the evidence.
72
Because White's lack of income and job security might well have
deterred a reasonable employee from filing a Title VII complaint,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of White.
73
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. 74 Although he agreed
with the majority that White had established a claim of discrimi-
natory retaliation, Justice Alito did not accept the standard estab-
lished by the majority. 75 First, whereas the majority construed
the scope of the word "discriminate" more broadly in the anti-
67. Id.
68. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2417.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that Title VII was amended in 1991 to provide
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination. Id. Therefore,
the majority held that it would undermine congressional intent to allow Burlington to es-
cape liability for its retaliation against White. Id.
72. Id. During White's suspension, her family was deprived of income for thirty-seven
days during the Christmas season without any indication of when, if ever, White would be
reinstated. Id. Furthermore, White sought medical treatment for depression resulting
from the suspension. Id.
73. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2417-18.
74. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2418-19.
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retaliation provision than in the substantive provision, Justice
Alito found no statutory support for the broader construction. 76 In
his opinion, where the anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful
to "discriminate against" an employee who has opposed conduct
prohibited by Title VII, the words "discriminate against" ought to
be given the meaning ascribed to them in the preceding substan-
tive discrimination provision. 77 The substantive discrimination
provision limits discrimination to actions affecting the terms and
conditions of employment, and Justice Alito suggested that the
word "discriminate" should be read the same way in both provi-
sions.
78
In addition to his preferred construction, Justice Alito noted
that White had urged another possible interpretation: discrimina-
tion denotes any disparity in treatment. 79 However, Justice Alito
rejected this interpretation because it fails to distinguish the le-
gitimate cases of retaliation from the trivial.
80
Justice Alito observed that the majority did not accept either of
these interpretations, but instead adopted a third.81 He then ar-
gued that the majority's justifications for its interpretation were
unconvincing.82 First, Justice Alito suggested that an employer is
more likely to retaliate against an employee by taking some action
at the workplace.8 3 Second, he noted that discrimination affecting
the terms and conditions of employment need not occur at the
workplace.8 4 For example, Justice Alito argued that in Rochon v.
Gonzales,8 5 where the FBI failed to provide off-duty security to an
employee whose life had been threatened, the FBI's inaction could
be construed as affecting the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.8 6 Such inaction, although occurring away from the work-
place, would therefore constitute actionable retaliation under his
interpretation of Title VII if it was based on the employee's race.8 7
76. Id. at 2419.
77. Id.
78. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 2418-19.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2419.
82. Id.
83. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2420.
85. 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).




Justice Alito also found the practical results of the majority's
position to be out of line with Congress' intent.8 8 Justice Alito ar-
gued that the majority's test, which inquires whether a reasonable
worker might be deterred from filing "a charge of discrimina-
tion,"8 9 would require judges to consider the particular circum-
stances of the underlying charge in order to determine whether
the alleged retaliation would have been sufficient to prevent a rea-
sonable person from filing a charge. 90 This, according to Justice
Alito, would lead to the illogical result that a more egregious act of
discrimination would require a more substantial and threatening
deterrent in order to dissuade a reasonable employee. 91
Justice Alito's practical objections to the majority's position also
included what he considered to be an unclear "reasonable em-
ployee" standard, which takes into account unspecified aspects of
an employee's personal character. 92 Further, he questioned the
standard of causation established by the majority, which refers to
an act that "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker."
93
Justice Alito contended that such an uncertain standard would
only further complicate an already complex area of the law.
94
Applying his own standard to White's case, Justice Alito con-
cluded that White's reassignment and suspension both satisfied
his definition of an adverse employment action. 95 Justice Alito
therefore concurred in the Court's judgment.
96
Since the enactment of Title VII, courts have disagreed funda-
mentally over the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, develop-
ing three distinct approaches to the question of which employer
actions fall within the proscriptive power of the statute. 97 In its
consideration of the instant case, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
position that the Third and Fourth Circuits had espoused. 98
Those courts have applied the same standard to retaliation claims
as they have to substantive discrimination claims: in order for
employer conduct to constitute actionable retaliation, it must "re-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2415 (majority opinion) (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219).
90. Id. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
91. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2421.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2421-22.
96. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2422 (Alito, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 2410-11 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 2410.
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sult in an adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of
employment." 99
The Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied an
even more stringent standard, finding actionable retaliation only
where an employer's conduct results in an "ultimate employment
decision," such as hiring, discharge, or an unfavorable decision
concerning leave, promotions, or compensation. 100
The least stringent of the three standards is that employed by
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District
of Columbia Circuits. 101 These courts have required only that the
plaintiff employee was subjected to an employer action that
"would have been material to a reasonable employee."'10 2
The Third Circuit adopted its "adverse employment action"
standard in Robinson v. Pittsburgh. 103 The plaintiff, Carmen Rob-
inson, was a female police officer employed by the City of Pitts-
burgh.104 Robinson alleged that she had been sexually harassed
by her supervisor, James Dickerson.105 After complaining to both
the chief and the assistant chief of police, Robinson filed an EEOC
charge based upon Dickerson's conduct. 106 Robinson subsequently
filed suit in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that she had
been subject to discriminatory retaliation for her EEOC charge. 10
7
According to Robinson, following the filing of her EEOC charge,
she suffered "reprisals at work."' 08 The district court granted the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the retalia-
tion claim, holding that Robinson had failed to establish a causal
connection between her EEOC charge and the alleged reprisals. 0 9
Writing for a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit, then-Circuit
Judge Samuel Alito affirmed the district court's grant of judgment
99. Id. (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
100. Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
101. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
102. Id. at 2410-11 (quoting Washington v. fl1. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
103. 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405.
104. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1291.
105. Id. According to Robinson, Dickerson had, inter alia, commented on the size of
Robinson's breasts, "unhook[ed] her bra, snapp[ed] her bra strap," touched Robinson's leg,
ear, hair, and waist, and "describe[ed] the position in which he and Robinson would have
sex if they were ever to do so." Id.
106. Id. at 1292.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1299. These alleged reprisals included restrictions of her job duties, reas-
signment to a position supervised by her alleged harasser, failure to transfer her from that
position, and "unsubstantiated oral reprimands." Id. at 1300.
109. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300.
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as a matter of law. 110 Judge Alito held that, even if Robinson
could establish a causal connection between her EEOC charge and
the alleged reprisals, those reprisals could not support a Title VII
retaliation claim because they failed to rise to the level of an ad-
verse employment action inasmuch as they did not alter the terms
and conditions of Robinson's employment, "deprive [her] of em-
ployment opportunities," or "adversely affect [her] status as an
employee." '111 Judge Alito, who would later apply the same ra-
tionale as author of the sole concurring opinion in Burlington,
112
reasoned that the standard applied to substantive discrimination
cases must also be applied to retaliation cases. 113
Four years later, the Fourth Circuit applied the same approach
to a Title VII retaliation case in Von Gunten v. Maryland.114 Bar-
bara von Gunten worked as an Environmental Health Aide for the
Maryland Department of the Environment (hereinafter 'MDE"). 115
Von Gunten alleged that almost immediately after they began
working together for the MDE, her supervisor, Vernon Burch, be-
gan sexually harassing her. 116 Von Gunten's complaints to man-
agement were unavailing. 117 Therefore, von Gunten contacted
MDE's Fair Practices Office to discuss her complaints and con-
cerns. 118 It was as a result of this contact that von Gunten
claimed to have suffered retaliation. 119
According to von Gunten, following her contact with the Fair
Practices Office, her company car was taken away and she was
forced to use her own vehicle for work. 120 Furthermore, von Gun-
110. Id. at 1303-04.
111. Id. at 1300 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)).
112. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2418 (2006) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
113. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300-01.
114. 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405.
115. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 861.
116. Id. at 862. Burch allegedly made sexually suggestive remarks, stared at and
touched parts of von Gunten's body against her will, and urinated from the boat on which
they worked. Id.
117. Id. Von Gunten contacted William Beatty, the head of her division, and complained
to him regarding Burch's conduct. Id. Thereafter, Beatty met with von Gunten and Burch
to discuss and distribute copies of MDE's anti-harassment policy. Id. According to von
Gunten, Burch's conduct worsened after this meeting. Id. In fact, von Gunten alleged that
Burch intentionally struck her on the buttocks with an oar, although Burch claimed the
contact was accidental. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 862. Von Gunten again complained to
Beatty, who reluctantly assigned her to work on a different boat. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 862. Von Gunten conceded, however, that she was entitled
to reimbursement for the use of her personal vehicle. Id.
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ten alleged that her year-end performance evaluation was down-
graded, that she was reassigned to a different task, and that she
suffered retaliatory harassment. 121 Von Gunten filed a charge
with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. 122
After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, von Gunten
filed suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, unlawful discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII. 123 The district court granted MDE's
motion for summary judgment on von Gunten's retaliation
claim. 124 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant
of summary judgment against von Gunten. 125 The court relied
upon its earlier decision in Ross v. Communications Satellite
Corp. 126 for the proposition that, absent countervailing policy con-
siderations, "conformity between the provisions of Title VII is to be
preferred." 127  Applying the Ross standard, the court concluded
that none of the allegedly retaliatory acts against von Gunten suf-
ficiently affected the terms and conditions of her employment to
constitute an adverse employment action.12
8 j
Prior to Burlington, other courts of appeals had adopted a
stricter approach to retaliation cases, holding that Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision only prohibits employer conduct that rises to
the level of an ultimate employment decision. 129 In Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., the plaintiff, Jean Mattern, alleged that her
employer, Eastman Kodak Co., retaliated against her after she
121. Id. at 862-63.
122. Id. at 863. While her EEOC charge was pending, MDE offered von Gunten a differ-
ent position, which would have required her to work in frequent contact with two of her
superiors who had been uncooperative regarding her previous allegations of discrimination.
Id. Von Gunten rejected this position and, when MDE continued to show little concern for
her complaints, she resigned. Id.
123. Id. at 863.
124. Von Gunten v. Md. Dep't of the Env't, 68 F. Supp. 2d 654, 664 (D. Md. 1999).
125. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
126. 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985).
127. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863 n.1 (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 366). In Ross, the
plaintiff had alleged that his employer retaliated against him by reducing his job responsi-
bilities and refusing to conduct an annual review of the employee's performance, thereby
denying his opportunity for a raise and increased benefits. Ross, 759 F.2d at 357. Further,
the plaintiff alleged that his employer made false statements to the plaintiffs prospective
employers. Id. The Ross court therefore reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer and remanded the case for trial, holding that the em-
ployee's allegations, if proven, could rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Id.
at 363. In Von Gunten, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the stricter "ultimate em-
ployment decision" standard and retained Ross's "adverse employment action" test. Von
Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865. The court stated that, while "ultimate employment decisions"
may certainly constitute unlawful retaliation, such a standard is excessively stringent. Id.
128. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 867-70.
129. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Burling-
ton N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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filed a sexual harassment charge with the EEOC. 130 Mattern al-
leged numerous retaliatory acts, including an investigatory visit
by two supervisors to Mattern's home when she had taken a sick
day, a reprimand for being away from her workstation, general
hostility from her coworkers, theft of tools from her locker, a lack
of concern over Mattern's illness allegedly resulting from her diffi-
culties at work, and a negative performance evaluation that pre-
vented Mattern from receiving a pay increase. 131 Shortly after
these allegedly retaliatory acts occurred, Mattern resigned. 132
At trial, the jury found in favor of Eastman on Mattern's sexual
harassment and constructive discharge claims, but found in favor
of Mattern on her retaliation claim. 133 The Fifth Circuit reversed
on the retaliation issue, holding that none of the allegedly retalia-
tory acts rose to the level of an ultimate employment decision. 134
According to the Fifth Circuit, in order to violate Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision, an employer's allegedly retaliatory conduct
must result in an ultimate employment decision, such as "hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating."'135
The court based this requirement on a comparative reading of
Title VII's substantive discrimination and anti-retaliation provi-
sions. 136 Based on the court's reading, the substantive discrimina-
tion provision proscribes vague harms which "would tend to de-
prive [the employee] of opportunities or adversely affect his
status," whereas the anti-retaliation provision refers simply to
"discrimination," without speaking in such wide-reaching
terms. 137 Therefore, the court concluded that the anti-retaliation
provision could not be read to include such "vague harms," but
rather only ultimate employment decisions. 138
The court held that Mattern had failed to show employer con-
duct of the requisite severity for two reasons.139 First, several of
Mattern's allegations - namely, general hostility from her co-
workers, the theft of tools from her locker, and the resulting anxi-
ety - clearly failed to reach the level of an ultimate employment
130. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 704.
131. Id. at 705-06.
132. Id. at 706.
133. Id. at 704.
134. Id. at 707-08.
135. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir.
1995)).
136. Id. at 708-09.
137. Id. at 709 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2000)).
138. Id. at 709.
139. Id. at 707-09.
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decision. 140 Moreover, these could not reasonably be attributed to
Eastman.141 Although some of Mattern's other allegations - in-
cluding the reprimand and the pay raise missed as a result of her
unfavorable performance review - seemed to be more severe, the
court found that these acts were of no real consequence. 142 Sec-
ond, the court held that, even if some of the allegedly retaliatory
acts may have eventually resulted in an ultimate employment de-
cision, Mattern resigned before Eastman could take any such ac-
tion. 14
3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed a similar approach in Manning v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. 144 The plaintiffs, who worked at a life insurance office,
alleged that they had suffered unlawful retaliation as a result of
their complaints regarding an adulterous affair between the
branch manager, Denise Mitchell, and a management trainee,
Charles Craig. 145 According to the plaintiffs, Craig made veiled
threats that he would have them killed for complaining about his
affair with Mitchell. 146 One of the plaintiffs, Constance Pritchett,
also alleged that the subsequent closing of the office was evidence
of retaliation against the plaintiff employees. 1
47
The district court granted Metropolitan Life's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law on all retaliation claims except Pritch-
ett's. 148 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
judgment as a matter of law as to the retaliation claims of all
plaintiffs other than Pritchett and reversed that court's denial of
judgment as a matter of law on Pritchett's retaliation claim.
149
According to the court, the basic prohibition of discrimination set
forth in Title VII's substantive discrimination provision also ap-
plies to the anti-retaliation provision. 150 For purposes of the anti-
retaliation provision, however, the court noted that an ultimate
140. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 708.
143. Id. at 709.
144. 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
145. Manning, 127 F.3d at 688.
146. Id. at 689. The plaintiffs further alleged more generally that they had suffered
"hostility and personal animus" as a result of their complaints, and that management ig-
nored their complaints regarding the allegedly hostile treatment. Id. at 692.
147. Id. at 693.
148. Id. at 689.
149. Id. at 693.
150. Manning, 127 F.3d at 692.
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employment decision was required. 151 Because the plaintiffs had
failed to produce evidence of a "tangible change in duties or work-
ing conditions that constituted a material employment disadvan-
tage," the court held that they could not meet the standard of an
ultimate employment decision. 152
In contrast to the "adverse employment action" and "ultimate
employment decision" standards, the District of Columbia Circuit
and Seventh Circuit have concluded that the standard in Title VII
retaliation cases is significantly lower. 153 Employing the standard
subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Burlington, the
Seventh Circuit held in Washington v. Illinois Department of Reve-
nue that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision proscribes any em-
ployer action that "would have been material to a reasonable em-
ployee."1
54
A material action, the court stated, is one that would have "dis-
suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination." 155 The court based its holding on the absence
of limiting terms in the anti-retaliation provision.156 Specifically,
the court noted that such terms are present in the substantive
discrimination provision's reference to discrimination "with re-
spect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment."1
57
The plaintiff in Washington had initially complained to state
and federal officials about the reassignment of some of her duties
to other people, alleging that the reassignment was racially-
motivated discrimination. 158 According to the plaintiff, Chrissie
Washington, following the filing of this complaint, her supervisors
caused her significant difficulties by rescinding the flex-time
151. Id. In previous cases, the same court concluded, respectively, that this standard
might have been satisfied where an employer gave negative references to the plaintiffs
potential employers, but not where a supervisor's staff had been replaced (thereby decreas-
ing the prestige and status of her position) but her salary and position were unchanged.
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d
1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1997).
152. Manning, 127 F.3d at 692.
153. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Washington v. Ill. Dep't of
Revenue, 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005).
154. Washington, 420 F.3d at 662.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, although the proscriptive effect of the anti-
retaliation provision is not limited to employment-related actions, "materiality" is an inte-
gral part of the term "discrimination" and therefore is a necessary feature of retaliation,
which is a species of discrimination. Id. at 661.
158. Id. at 659.
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schedule on which she had been permitted to work for approxi-
mately six years and then transferring her to another position
where flex time was not available. 159 Washington filed suit, alleg-
ing that the decision to rescind her flex-time schedule constituted
actionable retaliation under Title VII.160 The district judge
granted the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that Washington had not demonstrated that she
had suffered an adverse employment action. 161
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit resolved what it called an "illu-
sory" conflict among the panels of its court, reversing the district
court's grant of summary judgment against Washington and re-
manding the matter for trial. 162 The Seventh Circuit Court con-
cluded that a jury could find that the employer's actions would
have been sufficient to dissuade a reasonable employee in Wash-
ington's position from making a charge of discrimination.
163
Therefore, the court held that summary judgment was improper
because Washington's allegations, if true and if otherwise unex-
plained, would have constituted a "materially adverse" action. 164
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted this approach in Ro-
chon v. Gonzalez.165 The plaintiff, Donald Rochon, was employed
by the FBI as a Special Agent. 166 Rochon alleged that, after the
FBI received evidence of death threats directed toward Rochon
and his wife, they failed to provide Rochon with security or to in-
vestigate the threats.167 According to Rochon, the FBI was retali-
ating against him because he had previously filed two Title VII
racial discrimination charges against the FBI. 168 The district
court dismissed Rochon's retaliation claim on the ground that he
had not suffered an "adverse personnel action" sufficient to sup-
port a claim of retaliation. 1
69
159. Washington, 420 F.3d at 659. As a result of these decisions, Washington was forced
to take sick leave every day from 3:00 PM until 5:00 PM in order to continue taking care of
her son who had Down's Syndrome. Id. at 658-59. After exhausting her sick leave, Wash-
ington had to resort to an unpaid leave of absence until she was assigned to a supervisor
who allowed her to return to her flex-time schedule. Id. at 659.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 660, 663.
163. Id. at 663.
164. Washington, 420 F.3d at 663.
165. 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
166. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1213.
167. Id. at 1213-14.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1213.
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On appeal, Rochon contended that, because Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision contains no language limiting its scope to
employment-related actions, the district court had construed that
provision too narrowly.170 Although the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court had not previously considered the precise question of
the scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, it had dealt with
the analogous problem in the context of the anti-retaliation provi-
sion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter
"ADEA").171 In Passer v. American Chemical Society, the court
held that retaliation under the ADEA was not limited to adverse
employment actions. 172 Applying its ADEA rationale to "the
closely related context of Title VII," the Rochon court held that the
scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is not limited to em-
ployment-related actions. 173
The court found that the FBI's failure to investigate or protect
against threats to Rochon's life might well have dissuaded a rea-
sonable FBI agent from making or supporting a Title VII
charge.174 That is, a reasonable agent faced with death threats to
himself and his family, finding no protection from his employer,
might well have chosen to protect his family's safety rather than
pursue his Title VII right to a discrimination-free workplace. 175
Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Ro-
chon's claim and remanded it for consideration in light of the
newly articulated standard.1
76
Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Burlington clearly identi-
fied some of the difficulties that lower courts are likely to encoun-
ter in their attempts to apply the majority's holding. 177 Justice
Alito argued that the majority employed a "loose and unfamiliar"
standard of causation, defining a "materially adverse action" as
one that "might well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination."'178 Justice Alito's point is
170. Id. at 1214.
171. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1217 (citing Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)).
172. Id. (citing Passer, 935 F.2d at 331).
173. Id. at 1217. As further support for its conclusion, the court relied upon the Su-
preme Court's pronouncement in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. that the primary purpose of
anti-retaliation provisions is to maintain "unfettered access to statutory remedial mecha-
nisms." Id. at 1218 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
174. Id. at 1220.
175. Id.
176. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1220.
177. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2420-21 (2006) (Alito,
J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2421 (quoting id. at 2415 (majority opinion)) (emphasis added).
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well taken. At first blush, it seems as if the majority must have
developed a perfectly workable understanding of causation, only to
obfuscate it deliberately by substituting the words "might well" for
the perhaps more natural choice, "would." Practically speaking, it
may be a rare case indeed in which a jury would find that the
"might well" standard of causation was met, while the "would"
standard was not. However, an unfamiliar standard is not ipso
facto unworkable. Furthermore, the standard's subjectivity or
unpredictability, although excessive according to Justice Alito, is
in fact tempered by the majority's objective "reasonable worker"
standard.
Justice Alito was equally dissatisfied with the majority's "rea-
sonable worker" standard. 179 The problem, according to Justice
Alito, is that the majority opinion is unclear regarding the degree
to which the reasonable worker takes on the plaintiff-employee's
personal characteristics.18 0 Just as with the causation standard,
the "reasonable worker" criterion defies easy application. The ma-
jority leaves open the question of which and how many of a plain-
tiff-employee's characteristics are to be considered by the jury. 1
8'
Justice Alito's misgivings are likely to strike a chord among le-
gal professionals as well as employers and employees - all of
whom would certainly appreciate an easy-to-apply standard. To
be sure, clarity and predictability tend to find great favor in the
legal community and in the business world. Nevertheless, the al-
leged theoretical and semantic ambiguities of the majority opinion
will likely prove to be Burlington's greatest assets. As much as we
might wish to formulate a bright-line test for discriminatory re-
taliation, the reality of workplace interaction teaches us that such
a test is not only impracticable, but undesirable. Try as we might
to construct a purely objective, universal "reasonable worker"
against whose abstract perception a jury might test all manner of
allegedly retaliatory acts, the truth is that such an impersonal
standard is ill-suited to the task. An employer's retaliation is ren-
dered actionable not by the objective character of the acts commit-
ted, but rather by the effect of those acts on a particular employee.
Therefore, because retaliation depends for its existence upon the
perception and experience of an employee, and because each em-
ployee's perception and experience are necessarily informed by his
personal characteristics, it follows that the "reasonable worker"





must also incorporate certain subjective characteristics. Justice
Alito is correct to say that the majority has left us without a guide
to determine which individual features ought to be considered in a
particular case. However, this is precisely the strength of the Bur-
lington opinion - and its wisdom.
Despite its difficult application, Burlington represents the Su-
preme Court's ongoing commitment to the availability of remedies
under Title VII and to the fact-specific kind of analysis that will
ensure that the contours of Title VII continue to be sensitive to the
unique circumstances of every case. It was with this purpose in
mind that the majority reaffirmed the Court's statement in Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 182 that "the real social impact
of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of sur-
rounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are
not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the
physical acts performed."'183 With its opinion in Burlington, the
Supreme Court has ensured that lower courts will not have re-
course to a tidy formula, but will instead be compelled to consider
the circumstances of each case intimately, attending to the unique
character not only of the acts committed and suffered, but of the
people committing and suffering them.
Michael A. Metcalfe
182. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
183. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82).
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